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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-129(1 )(a) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(j). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), this matter was assigned to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, by Order of the Utah Supreme Court, dated July 5, 2007, 
and effective July 25, 2007. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As to factual findings, upon appeal from a contempt citation, contemnor 
has burden of demonstrating that, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial 
court, the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the trial court's findings. 
Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988). 
As to legal conclusions and rules of procedures, errors are questions of 
law which the Court of Appeals may review for correctness. Brown v. Glover. 16 
P.3d 540, 544 (Utah 2000); N.A.R.. Inc. v. Walker. 37 P.3d 1068, 1069 (Utah 
App. 2001). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
I. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - Rule 64D(e)(4) Interrogatories. 
The plaintiff shall submit with the affidavit or application interrogatories to 
the garnishee inquiring: ...whether the garnishee is deducting a liquidated 
amount in satisfaction of a claim against he plaintiff or the defendant, a 
designation as to whom the claim relates, and the amount deducted. 
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II. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - Rule 64D(g) Garnishee's 
responsibilities. 
The writ shall direct the garnishee to complete the following within seven 
business days of service of the writ upon the garnishee: (g)(1) answer the 
interrogatories under oath or affirmation; (g)(2) serve the answers on the plaintiff; 
(g)(3) serve the writ, answers, notice of exemptions and two copies of the reply 
form upon the defendant and any other person shown by the records of the 
garnishee to have an interest in the property; and (g)(4) file the answers with the 
clerk of the court. The garnishee may amend answers to interrogatories to 
correct errors or to reflect a change in circumstances by serving and filing the 
amended answers in the same manner as the original answers. 
III. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - Rule 64D(j)(2) Liability of garnishee. 
If the garnishee fails to comply with this rule, the writ or an order of the 
court, the court may order the garnishee to appear and show cause why the 
garnishee should not be ordered to pay such amounts as are just, including the 
value of the property or the balance of the judgment, whichever is less, and 
reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred by parties as a result of the 
garnishee's failure. If the garnishee shows that the steps taken to secure the 
property were reasonable, the court may excuse the garnishee's liability in whole 
or in part. 
IV. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure - Rule 24(a)(9) 
...A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state 
the request explicitly and set for the legal basis for such an award. 
STATEMENT 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This case is a legal dispute over improperly asserted bank offset rights and 
penalties for contempt of a district court order. This matter deals with the efforts 
of Bud Bailey Construction, the judgment creditor and Appellee herein, to garnish 
the bank deposit account of Construction Associates, Inc. dba KRT Drywall, the 
judgment debtor; the repeated failure by Cache Valley Bank, the bank where the 
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deposit account of the judgment debtor was located and the Appellant herein, to 
comply with a garnishment order of the district court; and the award granted to 
the Appellee by the district court for contempt of a valid garnishment order. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
Following a default judgment, Appellee filed a writ of garnishment to collect 
monies owed. Appellant answered the garnishment interrogatories indicating it 
had $17,910.94, but failed to claim an offset for any funds owed to the Appellant. 
Appellant failed to remit monies identified in their answers to garnishment 
interrogatories. The district court issued an Order to Show Cause in re contempt. 
Following three evidentiary hearings to allow Appellant to produce evidence that 
it had not violated Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 64D, the district court found Appellant in 
contempt of the order of the district court. For its contempt, the district court 
ordered that Appellant pay the balance of the judgment pursuant to Rule 
64DQ')(2) plus attorney fees and costs incurred by Appellee. 
III. DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT. 
By an Order dated May 9, 2008, the district court found, among other 
things, that: 1) Appellant failed to claim an offset in its answers to interrogatories 
or at any other relevant time as required by law; 2) circumvented a valid 
judgment and valid garnishment with an alleged de-facto receivership; 3) was in 
contempt of a valid garnishment and order; and 4) as a penalty for the contempt 
was ordered to pay the remaining judgment amount together with attorney fees 
and costs incurred by Appellee. R. 234-243. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about April 3, 2006, the district court entered default judgment in the 
amount of $46,919.79 against Construction Associates, Inc. dba KRT Drywall 
("judgment debtor") in favor of the Appellee. R. 72-74. 
2. On or about April 14, 2006, Appellee filed with the district court an 
application for writ of garnishment in the judgment amount of $46,919.79. R. 75-
77. 
3. On or about April 14, 2006, the district court issued a writ of garnishment to 
Appellant R. 83-85. 
4. On or about April 24, 2006, Appellant was served with the writ of 
garnishment. R. 82. 
5. On or about April 27, 2006, Appellant filed with the district court 
garnishee's answers to interrogatories for property and other earnings. In its 
answers to interrogatories Appellant acknowledged $8,150.08 being present in 
the account of the judgment debtor. Appellant in response to interrogatory 3 
claimed no offsets or deductions. R. 78-81. 
6. On or about May 18, 2006, Appellant remitted the amount of $8,150.08 to 
the Appellee. 
7. On or about October 19, 2006, Appellee filed with the district court a 
another application for writ of garnishment in the judgment amount of $46,919.79 
with $38,769.71 still owing. R. 98-100. 
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8. On or about October 19, 2006, the district court issued a writ of 
garnishment to Appellant in the judgment amount of $46,919.79 with $38,769.71 
still unpaid. R. 83-85. 
9. On or about November 1, 2006, Appellant was served with the writ of 
garnishment. R. 105. 
10. On or about November 8, 2006, Appellant filed with the district court 
garnishee's answers to interrogatories for property and other earnings. In its 
answers to interrogatories Appellant acknowledged $17,901.94 being present 
from the account of the judgment debtor. In response to interrogatory three 
Appellant claimed no offsets or deductions. R. 101-104. 
11. On or about January 25, 2007, the district court issued a Garnishee Order 
to Show Cause in re contempt ordering the Appellant to appear before the district 
court on February 12, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. to show cause: 1) why Appellant should 
not be ordered to appear before the district court to explain its failure to obey the 
order of the district court; 2) why Appellant should not be held in contempt for its 
failure to release the amount garnished; 3) why Appellant should not be ordered 
to pay the amount that has been garnished from the judgment debtor's account; 
4) why Appellee should not be awarded its attorneys fees and costs for having to 
bring this order to show cause; and 5) why Appellee should not be awarded such 
further relief as the district court deems just and equitable under the 
circumstances. R. 120-121. 
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12. On or about February 12, 2007, the district court heard arguments on the 
order to show cause in re contempt. Counsel for Appellant failed to appear and 
was contacted by the district court via phone. The district court set an additional 
hearing for February 26, 2007. The district court granted attorney fees to 
Appellee. R. 133-134. 
13. On or about February 26, 2007, the day of the hearing, Appellant filed with 
the district court a response to garnishment and order to show cause in re 
contempt. R. 135-158. 
14. On or about February 26, 2007, the district court again heard arguments 
on the order to show cause in re contempt. At the hearing, Appellant requested 
an additional evidentiary hearing to provide more evidence to the district court. 
The district court granted the Appellant's requests and set a third hearing for April 
2, 2007. The district court again granted attorney fees to Appellee. R. 159-160. 
15. On or about March 13, 2007, Appellant filed with the district court a 
supplemental memorandum in support of it's response to garnishment and order 
to show cause in re contempt. In the supplemental memorandum, Appellant 
asserted that after it had answered the writ and remitted the [first] garnishment 
amount, the bank exercised the remedy to offset amounts owed to the bank by 
commencing a de-facto receivership to monitor and control the bank accounts of 
the judgment debtor. R. 161-170. 
16. On or about March 13, 2007, in support of its supplemental memorandum, 
Appellant filed with the district court an affidavit of garnishee. In the affidavit of 
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the bank president, Appellant asserted it had disregarded the order of the district 
court, by exercising the remedy to offset amounts owed to the bank by "more or 
less operating a de-facto receivership." R. 171-180. 
17. On or about March 27, 2007, Appellee filed with the district court its reply 
memorandum in opposition. In its reply, Appellee argued that: 1) the actions of 
the Appellant where wholly inconsistent with exercising a right to offset; 2) the 
Appellant failed to timely assert the right to offset in its answers to garnishment 
interrogatories as required by Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 64D(g); and 3) it be granted 
its attorney fees and costs pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 64D(j)(2) for 
garnishee's failure to comply with Rule 64D, the writ and the order of the district 
court. R. 181-201. 
18. On or about April 2, 2007, Appellant filed with the district court a further 
supplemental exhibit for supplemental memorandum in support of its response to 
garnishment and order to show cause in re contempt, in an attempt to show its 
rights to offset. R. 202-232. 
19. On or about April 2, 2007, the district court held a third hearing heard on 
the order to show cause in re contempt. Following the third hearing, Appellant 
again requested a further hearing to provide additional evidence of its right to 
disregard the order of the district court under a power of de-facto receivership. 
The district court denied the request for a fourth hearing and ordered Appellee to 
prepare the findings of fact and order for the hearing. The district court again 
granted attorney fees to Appellee. R. 233. 
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20. At the third evidentiary hearing held on or about April 2, 2007, the district 
court found that Appellant allowed 27 checks to clear through the bank account 
of the judgment debtor to pay other parties in the amount of $42,412.48 after 
Appellant had received the garnishment. R. 272, page 2 at 1J9-11, 16-17. 
21. The Order of the district court was entered on May 9, 2008. In the Order 
the Court found, among other things, that: 1) Appellant failed to provide an offset 
in its answers to interrogatories or at any other relevant time as required by law; 
2) circumvented a valid judgment and valid garnishment with a de-facto 
receivership; 3) was in contempt; and 4) as a penalty was ordered to pay the 
remaining garnishment amount together with attorney fees and costs. R. 234-
243. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court properly found that Appellant did not properly offset the 
debts of the judgment debtor but instead ignored a valid garnishment and valid 
court order by permitting the judgment debtor to operate its account to pay third 
parties - performing these actions under the authority of a self created de-facto 
receivership. By these actions the Appellant was properly found to be in 
contempt of a valid garnishment and valid court order and, therefore required to 
pay Appellee the balance of the judgment plus attorney fees and costs pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 64D. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN ON APPEAL AND 
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE REGARDING THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT. 
Upon appeal from a contempt citation, contemnor has the burden of 
demonstrating that, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court, the 
evidence at trial was insufficient to support the trial court's findings. Utah Farm 
Production Credit Ass'n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988). Additionally, 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states that a party 
challenging a fact finding "must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." Though many overly zealous advocates may be tempted to 
read this requirement less than literally, the reported cases clearly indicate that 
the courts are serious about enforcing the requirement under its express terms. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has set forth the requirement as follows: 
[t]he marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. 
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and 
fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge 
the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the 
appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is 
clearly erroneous. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 
1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The marshaling requirement is a procedural mechanism that is designed to 
protect the trial court's fact-finding prerogative and to promote the efficiency and 
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quality of an appellate court's review. Under the terms of the rule, a party who is 
challenging a trial court's finding of fact is required to include a listing of all pieces 
of evidence that support the trial court's finding in the argument section of the 
opening brief. 
Appellant has failed to meet this burden and failed to comply with the 
marshaling requirements of Utah R. App. P. Rule 24 As a result, the Court 
should reject Appellants' arguments and affirm the findings by the district court 
that 1) the bank [Appellant] failed to provide an offset as required by law; 2) the 
bank was not in compliance with the garnishment statute as required under Rule 
64; 3) the bank was in contempt of the order court; and 4) as a result the bank 
was ordered to pay the balance of the judgment - all should be affirmed. R. 272, 
page 22 at IP 9-25, page 24 at IP-3. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ORDERED APPELLANT TO PAY 
THE BALANCE OF THE JUDGMENT TO APPELLEE FOR ITS FAILURE 
TO COMPLY WITH RULE 64D OF THE UTAH R. CIV. P. AND FOR ITS 
CONTEMPT OF THE ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT. 
It was apparent from the evidence submitted to the district court that 
Appellant failed to exercise any rights to offset and violated the rule [Utah R. Civ. 
P. Rule 64D], the writ and the order of the district court. As a result, the district 
court properly ordered, pursuant to the Rule 64DG)(2), that Appellant pay the 
balance of the judgment to Appellee for its failure to comply with Rule 64D, the 
writ and the order of the court. 
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A. Right to Offset 
Appellant argues in its opening brief that the district court erred by not 
recognizing the legal right of offset. The Appellant is in error on this point and 
has misunderstood the three previous evidentiary hearings, the record of the 
district court, its prior filings at the district court and the affidavit of its own Bank 
President. 
Three steps must be taken to maintain an offset. There must first be an 
intent and decision to exercise the right to offset, a subsequent action which 
completes the offset, and finally a record which verifies that the action has been 
taken. See United Seeks, Inc. v. Eagle Green Corp.. 389 N.W. 2d 571 (Neb. 
1986); Baker v. National City Bank of Cleveland. 511 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1975). 
A mere declaration of intent to offset retrospectively does not establish a setoff. 
In re Archer, 34 B.R. 28 (N.D. Tex. 1983). 
Appellant failed to meet any of the requirements for maintaining a right to 
offset but instead claimed retrospectively that it in principle had asserted a right 
to offset when served with the writ of garnishment by starting a de-facto 
receivership. The district court found that the actions of the Appellant where 
inconsistent with an actual proper offset. 
The district court thoroughly considered the arguments of the Appellant by 
providing three evidentiary hearings to allow Appellant to present evidence that it 
properly exercised an offset. To illustrate proof of an offset, the Appellant 
claimed retrospectively that it in principle had asserted a right to setoff when 
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served with the writ of garnishment by starting a de-facto receivership so as to 
not technically take the money of the judgment debtor by offsetting but rather 
allowing the judgment debtor to operate its account and pay Appellant at a later 
date. 
When the Appellant was questioned by the district court about what power 
or authority it had to operate a de-facto receivership, Appellant submitted the 
Affidavit of Bank President Gregg Miller, which stated in pertinent part that: 
In light of the perceived insolvency of the Third-Party Defendants, 
and their probable inability to repay outstanding loan obligations, 
Bank management began operation of, more or less, a 
receivership to allow deposits to be made into the bank 
accounts, with Bank management control over all 
disbursements made from the accounts." R. 172 at U 4. 
Throughout the de-facto receivership, the Bank has only 
allowed certain disbursements to be made that would allow 
Third-Party Defendant to continue business operations in a way 
that would allow for the repayment of loans to the Bank." R. 172 
atH5. 
Further, in an attempt to clarify the retrospectively claimed right to offset 
the bank stated in pertinent part that: 
...the bank is controlling the funds it's controlling how they're spend 
in furtherance of its own interest. If the bank is entitled to all of those 
funds and if they release funds so they can be paid more in the 
future, that to me seems to go right in the line of the bank's authority 
to keep all the funds and control it for themselves and pay off debts. 
R. 272, page 7 at ff20-25 and page 8 at fl1-2. 
Despite three evidentiary hearings, the Appellant was unable to 
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the district court that a de-facto receivership 
was allowed under the security agreements signed by the judgment debtor or 
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that a de-facto receivership existed under the any law, contract, banking 
regulation, code provision or the UCC. In fact, the district court's comments on 
the Appellants failure to provide evidentiary support are instructive: 
No, there is no place in the security agreement that it says it can 
have a de-facto receivership. What it does is it says it can seize the 
account and it lists the items that it can seize and take control of 
those items and have them pay their debts but it can't substitute 
itself for the court or substitute itself for somebody else and say, 
"You know what, I'm going to pay your claim but I'm not going to 
allow your claim. I'm going to move your claim ahead of this claim 
because I think that's in my interest to move your claim ahead of my 
claim." I mean, they're taking on a role there that I think is really 
unique under the law and I don't think it's allowed, that's what I'm 
trying to ask. R. 272, page 6 at H24-25, page 7 at 1J1-10. 
...when the bank checks clear it's not the bank receiving the money 
on their loans or anything else, it's allowing another party to receive 
a debt they have against this party and it appears to me that the 
bank with this de-facto receivership is deciding as against a court 
order that these people have the right to receive the funds ahead of 
themselves, the bank, because they're not taking the funds for 
themselves. I understood if they said, okay, we want an offset, we're 
closing down this account, we're taking the money to offset, we think 
there's a danger they're not going to pay and they exercise that. I 
don't have any problem with doing that as I read the documents but I 
don't understand how they can allow themselves in this defecto 
receivership to go against a court order and say these other people 
have a right to get the money instead of us, the bank, and instead of 
the garnishee, I mean the person that garnished. R. 272, page 2 at 
1f18-25, page 3 at 1|1-8. 
Next, contrary to the assertions of the Appellant in its opening brief, the 
district court found that although Appellant may have had a right to offset, it failed 
to properly exercise that right. The district court found in pertinent part that: 
...they [Appellant] made a determination that instead of taking 
the money for themselves, they wanted the money to go to 
other parties to pay their debts and move these other parties' 
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debts in front of a valid judgment with a garnishment filed. 
They decided, we can do that. And I don't think in the law they can 
do that. There is no where in the law I think they can do that 
because that's not an offset. They're not offsetting. They're 
allowing somebody else to get the money instead of 
themselves. R. 272 at page 20, lines 1-19. 
... the bank with this de-facto receivership is deciding as against a 
court order that these people [third-parties] have the right to 
receive the funds ahead of themselves, the bank, because 
they're not taking the funds for themselves, I understood if they 
said, okay, we want an offset, we're closing down this account, we're 
taking the money to offset, we think there's a danger they're not 
going to pay and they exercise that. I don't have a problem with 
doing that. . . . R. 272 at page 2, lines 18-25 and page 3, lines 1-8. 
... the bank has the right to take it off their debts, to offset their 
loans, to offset their payments but they didn't do that. That's 
the difficulty that I have. That's not what they did. They allowed 
it to be paid to other parties other than themselves...they 
decided that could do this in this de-facto receivership and 
that's what I'm saying, that's where I really have problems with the 
law because there's nothing in the law that I'm aware of that allows 
them to do that. R. 272 at page 6, lines 6-16. 
The district court was very clear in finding that the Appellant had the right 
to offset but that Appellant failed to exercise that right. From the three 
evidentiary hearings, the evidence showed that Appellant not only failed to 
exercise the right to offset in its actions but also failed to assert the defense of 
offset in its answers to garnishment interrogatories as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 
Rule 64D. 
Appellant at all relevant times had the opportunity and privilege under Rule 
64D(g) to amend its answers to the garnishment interrogatories to properly claim 
any rights to offset. Appellant failed to exercise that privilege. Notwithstanding, 
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even if Appellant had requested to amend its answers and had been permitted to 
amend its answers to garnishment interrogatories to claim any rights to offset, 
the district court found that the actions of the Appellant failed to demonstrate an 
offset. 
As a result, in its order the district court properly held that Appellant had 
failed to claim an offset in its answers to garnishment interrogatories or at any 
other relevant time by amending its answers to interrogatories as provided by 
Rule64D(g). R. 249. 
The Appellants argument that it has a right to offset which was not 
recognized by the district court is not correct. It is clear from the record that 
rather than exercise a right to offset Appellant instead managed disbursements 
from the account under a self-proclaimed de-facto receivership. It is apparent 
from the record that the district court found that Appellant had a security interest 
and had a right to offset funds when it received the garnishment but chose not to 
protect itself by failing to assert a right to offset by its actions or by asserting the 
same in its answer to garnishment interrogatories. 
B. Scope of Garnishment 
Appellant argues in its opening brief that the district court erred when it 
ordered it to pay the balance of the judgment not for violation of Rule 64D or for 
contempt of the court's order but rather on the basis of a continuing garnishment 
and a superior security interest. The Appellant is in error on this point and has 
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misunderstood the three previous evidentiary hearings, the record of the district 
court and the affidavit of its own Bank President. 
Contrary to the assertions of the Appellant, the district court did not find 
that Appellee had a "superior" or "higher security interest" from that of the 
Appellant. Instead the district court found that Appellee had a security interest 
superior to the third-parties which Appellant allowed the judgment debtor to pay 
over $42,000.00 ahead of the Appellee's garnishment under the Appellant's self 
titled power of a de-facto receivership. The district court found in pertinent part: 
...I agree with you that if they have a remedy for offset, they 
have monies that they want to claim for themselves and for 
their own debts, they can do that and I don't have any quarrel 
with that because I think the law allows that... . R. 272 at page 4, 
lines 23-25 
...No, it didn't...I understand the bank's argument and I 
understand the security agreement but I've dealt with this and that 
means the bank has the right to take it off their debts, to offset 
their loans, to offset their payments but they didn't do that. 
That's the difficulty that I have. That's not what they did. They 
allowed it to be paid to other parties other than 
themselves...they decided that could do this in this de-facto 
receivership and that's what I'm saying, that's where I really have 
problems with the law because there's nothing in the law that I'm 
aware of that allows them to do that. R. 272 at page 6, lines 6-16. 
... I have given Cache Bank [Appellant] now three hearings to 
produce the evidence to show what they did...This is the third 
hearing, special hearing that I have allowed Cache Bank...the 
affidavit of the personfthe Bank president] is we created a de-
facto receivership, and so we control how or where this money 
was spent and we allowed money to be sent to these third 
parties in front of a valid garnishment for a valid 
judgment...they [Cache Bank] made a determination that 
instead of taking the money for themselves, they wanted the 
money to go to other parties to pay their debts and move these 
8 
other parties' debts in front of a valid judgment with a 
garnishment filed. They decided, we can do that. And I don't think 
in the law they can do that. There is no where in the law I think they 
can do that because that's not an offset. They're not offsetting. 
They're allowing somebody else to get the money instead of 
themselves. R. 272 at page 20, lines 1-19. 
The Appellant has failed to understand the significance of the district 
court's findings with regard to its rights. The district court did not find that 
Appellee had a superior security interest. Rather the district court found that 
while Appellant had a secured interest in the funds and had a right to offset the 
funds of the judgment debtor, it failed to exercise those rights. 
It is apparent from the record that the district court found that Appellant 
had a security interest and had a right to offset funds when it received the 
garnishment but chose not to protect itself by failing to exercising that right and 
take monies for itself. The decision of the Appellant to not exercise its rights left 
Appellee with the next "superior" security interest. However, Appellant allowed 
third-parties to receive funds exceeding $42,000.00 under the self-proclaimed 
power of de-facto receivership that should have gone to the Appellee by right of 
its garnishment. The district court found that: 
...they [Appellant] moved all these other people so the checks could 
go out and pay them ahead of their own [Appellant], [and] ahead of 
the garnishment that came in that I believe under the law had a 
superior security interest. R. 9 at fl 4-7. 
The district court was correct when it stated "they [Appellant] either had to 
take them themselves or give them to somebody that had a higher security 
interest" that being the Appellee. R. 9 at If 13-15. 
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Appellant also argues the district court made it pay the balance of the 
judgment on the basis of a continuing garnishment. The Appellant is also in error 
on this point. The record indicates that the district court was not treating it as a 
continuing garnishment but rather ordering it to pay the balance of the judgment 
as a penalty for contempt of the district court's garnishment order. 
From the evidence submitted to the district court the record clearly 
indicates, the Appellant was in violation of Rule 64D, the writ and the order of the 
court. At the third evidentiary hearing held on April 2, 2007, the district court 
found: 
I'm going to make the following findings based on the evidence. It 
appears that the date of the garnishment was November 1, 2006. 
Following that the bank failed to provide an offset as required by 
law, they didn't set the offset as required by law. And so when 
we had the notice and the order to show cause they weren't in 
compliance with the garnishment statute as required within 
Rule 64, because they didn't provide notice within the required 
time...they didn't provide that notice timely as required under the 
garnishment statute. Even though they had notice of garnishment 
and everything else, they didn't provide the notice that is required 
under the garnishment statute that there was an offset...what they 
did violated and was in contempt of the order of the Court. And 
as a result they should be ordered to pay the amount of the 
garnishment. R. 272 at page 22, lines 19-25, page 23, lines 1-8, 
and page 24, lines 1-3. 
Ultimately it was the failure of the Appellant to comply with the rule, the writ 
and the order of the district court that functioned as the reason Appellant was 
ordered to pay the balance of the judgment. The district court found this to be in 
violation of rule 64D which states in pertinent part: 
10 
If a garnishee fails to comply with this rule [Rule 64D], the writ or an 
order of the court, the court may order the garnishee to appear and 
show cause why the garnishee should not be ordered to pay such 
amounts as are just, including the value of the property or the 
balance of the judgment, whichever is less, and reasonable costs 
and attorney fees incurred by parties as a result of the garnishee's 
failure. 
Despite the assertions of the Appellant, the district court recognized the 
legal rights of Appellant but found the Appellant failed to exercise those legal 
rights. In addition, the district court found that Appellant had allowed 27 checks 
to clear through the bank account of the judgment debtor to pay other parties in 
the amount of $42,412.48 after Appellant had received the garnishment. R. 272, 
page 2 at 1J9-11, 16-17. It was based upon these actions that the Appellant was 
found to be in contempt and properly ordered under Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 
64D(j)(2) to pay the balance of the judgment as a penalty for contempt. 
Accordingly, the Court should reject points 1 & 2 of Appellants' argument 
and affirm the order of the district court. 
III. ANY POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN SERVICE OF THE WRIT OF 
GARNISHMENT BECAME MOOT WHEN APPELLANT FILED 
ANSWERS TO GARNISHMENT INTERROGATORIES AND ENTERED 
AN APPEARANCE OF LEGAL COUNSEL. 
Appellant acknowledges before this Court in its opening brief that "once it 
entered an appearance through its legal counsel it...waived, for purposes of the 
future proceedings any previous defects in the service of process." See p. 41 of 
Appellants' Opening Brief. The Court should affirm the district court on this 
basis alone. 
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Appellant argues in its brief that its failure to assert is rights to claim an 
offset, as required by Rule 64D(h), in answering the writ of garnishment 
interrogatories should be excused for improper service of the writ of garnishment. 
The failure of Appellant to assert a right to claim an offset is no one's fault but the 
Appellant's. The Appellant was properly served with the writ of garnishment and 
the record is devoid of any contention by Appellant following the second 
evidentiary hearing (when the district court found service to be proper) that 
proper service was an issue. Rule 64D(e) requires garnishee [Appellant] to 
assert any rights, exemptions, claims or deductions against a debtor. The rule 
further requires the garnishee [Appellant] assert those rights, exemptions, claims 
or deductions in the answers to garnishment interrogatories within seven 
business days and under oath or affirmation. Appellant timely answered the 
garnishment interrogatories but failed to assert any rights to indebtedness, 
exemptions, offset, or deductions against he judgment debtor as required by 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 64D. 
Notwithstanding, Appellant is deemed to have been properly served with 
the writ of garnishment when it timely filed answers to the garnishment 
interrogatories and entered an appearance of legal counsel. See Upper Blue 
Bench Irr. Dist. v. Continental Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 1937, 93 Utah 325, 72 P.2d 
1048 (The district court which is court of general jurisdiction, had jurisdiction of 
garnishee bank, which entered appearance by filing answer in garnishment 
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proceeding by irrigation district's judgment creditor, even if writ served on bank 
was impotent to require answer.) 
Appall ml il ill H li- i ml 1 Ii ill lliu upijuiluii i l , JIUJ [jiiN/ileye undui Kule 
64D(g) to amend its answers to the garnishment interrogatories to pmpprly i i^im 
any rights to offset. Appellant failed to exercise that privilege. Notwithstanding, 
even il Appellor ' I Pct'ii pen ml led lo -Jinenil il , ;. ,v. is to garnishment 
interrogatories to claim any rights to offset th<= dir*r— -• -
actions y the- Appellant failed tc- dfinor.strate an offset. 
£.. ^ -_0. :*... u.sui^i OOUM .^ iOpcrriv .i iiia. appellant had 
failed to claim an offset in its ; - -»s m A\ . inv 
other relevant time by amending its answers to interrogatories as provided by 
Ruleb4D|g) li _4M 
In ndditinri /'ii| >' 4 
certainly deals with garnishments or, a regular
 v:; r.jt caii basii,. Appellant 
certainly accepts and responds to garnishments on a frequent enough bases to 
I i,i>/< • in pl.ii'p pirio-'durf-s . 111H -.all •(.|ii,iui.-1 li i m ihly ni,:iri.n|i'ineiil i n li •< |, il umn^d 
The district court found .:• .ant part u.cu. 
...Garnishments and these kinds of things and liens are things that 
happen all the time. I mean, it's seems quite incredible to me that 
they don't understand the legal ramifications of this, and they create 
something that in the law, I mean, they even have to call it the de-
facto receivership which means it's really not a legal one, it's just 
one we've created of our own doing. R. 272 at page 11, lines 6-12. 
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There is no prejudice because Appellant timely answered the garnishment 
interrogatories. There is no relevant issue regarding service of the writ of 
garnishment and there is no basis to permit Appellant to amend its answer to the 
garnishment interrogatories to now claim a right to offset it clearly failed to assert 
previously. Accordingly, the Court should reject point 4 of Appellants' argument 
and affirm the order of the district court. 
IV. APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
AWARDED BY THE DISTRICT COURT AND ON APPEAL. 
Appellee is entitled to its attorney fees and costs awarded by the district 
court and on appeal because its action arises from Rule 64D of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which provides for an award of fees and costs for Appellant's 
failure to comply with the rule [Rule 64D], the writ and the order of the district 
court. 
Appellee explicitly requests its attorney fees for this appeal. "A party 
seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request 
explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award." Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9). The legal basis for an award of attorney fees to Appellee arises from 
Rule 64D(j)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Order to Show Cause 
in re Contempt issued by the district court. R. 120-121. Specifically, "if a 
garnishee [Appellant] fails to comply with this rule, the writ or an order of the 
court, the court may order the garnishee to pay such amounts as are just, 
including the value of the property or the balance of the judgment, which ever is 
14 
less, and reasonable costs and attoriiey fees incurred by parties as a i est ilt of 
Kit? garnishee s appellant] failure Jtah R. Civ„ P. 64D(j)(2)(2QQ6)„ The 
assessment of attorns 'f'-"^ rui-l ' osts-. aga»nr.l .. .- *,: rr>, 
failure -c co^v> with Rule 64D is pi oper and should be affirmed. Also, "|f]hf 
ye . , ... -a - ^ ~ a party —•—eoe*ved attorney fees below prevails on 
ann^q . ^jn^bly inclined on appeal" Brown 
v Ricv* :i:- _-4_ r .L.j> ; iv, ;5G
 vUiau Ci. /*.vp 19"":!' "\ 
1 f .-r district coi!r* irdered for the failure of the Appellant to comply with 
Rui- : • . K i»ee was c!i;;Uu 10 auorney lees and 
costs pursuant to Utah R. oiv. P. 64D(j)(2)(2006 * ^ 7. 
Accordingly, Appellee is entitled to its attorney fee- and costs awarded .r.^a. 
1:1 le clisti' ict coi it t togetl lei itl i tf lose ii icurred on appeal. 
Accordingly, the Court should reject pnmi :ii nil Apppilanis ,• 'qumenl • nji 
affirm the ordei of the district court. 
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CONCLUSION 
The decision of the district court should be affirmed and Appellee is 
entitled to its attorney fees and costs awarded initially by the district court 
together with those incurred on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20 th day of June, 2( 
BABCOCK 
ROBERT F. BABCQ0K 
CODYW/WILSON 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 20 day of June, 2008, a true and correct 
( ni ||n> tnn:;t)oiiiL| document was served by the method indicated 
below, to the following: 
• U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
• Certified Mail 
• Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile 
• Other: 
N. George Daines (USB No 0803) 
DAINES & WYATT 
108 North Main Street 
Logan, Utah 84321-4552 
Telephone (435) 753-4000 
Facsimile (435) 753-4002 
Attorneys for Garnishee/Appellant 
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1 THE COURT: But the second one on November 1 they 
2 said they entered into something called a defacto 
3 receivership. Now nowhere under the law of garnishment or 
4 nowhere in the documents of any document that I have read 
5 from the bank that I have gone through, do I have this 
6 defacto receivership and I understand receivership in 
7 bankruptcy, I understand receiverships but I don't know what 
8 this defacto receivership is and let me tell you the biggest 
9 issue I have with the bank. There are, since the date of the 
10 garnishment, 27 checks were allowed to be cleared through the 
11 bank account. One credit card payment was allowed to clear 
12 through the bank and then one auto transfer debit, I assume 
13 that was a debit card or something like that for $11,000. So 
14 there was a debit card allowed to clear through the bank. To 
15 me that would indicate that - and in that amount is 
16 $42,412.48 from after they received the garnishment, they 
17 allowed to be cleared and paid to other parties. I mean, 
18 when the bank checks clear it's not the bank receiving the 
19 money on their loans or anything else, it's allowing another 
20 party to receive a debt they have against this party and it 
21 appears to me that the bank with this defacto receivership is 
22 deciding as against a court order that these people have the 
23 right to receive the funds ahead of themselves, the bank, 
24 because they're not taking the funds for themselves, I 
25 understood if they said, okay, we want an offset, we're 
CI:)CITM d wn i ti i .ji t "(jui i i , we' re taking the money to offset, 
we mink there's a danger they' re not going to pay and they 
ex^- ~ " -• ' 3i r t: hrtve ,-iny problem with doing that as 1 
read the documents but 1 don't understand hou they can allow 
themselves in this defarUi re< v- i i-( rsu i j \u -i jyainst a court 
order and say these other people have
 a rignt to get the 
money instead oi uo, the os*~ * •- ••^ •.-^ - th^ i n i n i
 k,liee , 
I mean, the person that garnished. That's what I don't 
understand under the law because I can't find thdt oi icid 
llicji 1 ' t iii=iL in anywhere under the lawn, So that's an 
issue I need to understand. 
. u : rcugn that. What happened 
and i n racr, about a year aoo -- when the bank's served 
the first qa ni i slmi'Mii nnl llio i> i iKiudible) dropped, the 
ball on that one (inaudible) garnishment and didn't exercise 
the right (inaudible) at C-t : : ~ie. 
Then in October 1 believe it was, don't know the 
exact dattr , •' i "audible) served the sec . , - . , , - .
 ( 
* u-:' exercisec tnat remeo\ ana ::iey t:t --•=- it 
off, rney drew \L out the account and applied all the funds 
they tuwaids tlic loan a^d 
urat ^ snown .:.:. our supplemental exhibit, Le^'s SP<= v^i^h 
rr- . t is. That :' ~ " • . ^:.L ^emordi 
->~:\:r - v^^ °an ^ee unere the lc-in .amount t aaain -* 'he 
top iu $46,300 arid inen aow: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
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20 
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25 
principle only payment on 11-17 for that amount, $17,000. 
The bank did allow the debtors to do business but they 
monitored - it was some time after the first punch list that 
they began to monitor payments coming in and only allow 
certain ones to go out. 
THE COURT: How could you allow certain to go out 
if they have a garnishment that the court says comes before 
the amount they allow to go out? I mean, how do they allow 
it to go out legally? 
MR. JENSON: The first garnishment would have 
expired after 120 days. That's under the rule. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JENSON: So after that time the bank, the bank 
was (inaudible) total of three loans, couple hundred thousand 
dollars together. They didn't want to kill the business, 
they wanted it to keep going. 
THE COURT: Okay, okay -
MR. JENSON: So they -
THE 
how can they 
cases, I read 
COURT: 
do that? 
I understand what they did. Legally 
That's my question because I read the 
everything and there' 
I can find that allows 
garnishment. 
1 offset, they 
I agree 
s nothing in the law that 
them to do that once they 
with you that if they have 
have monies that they 
themselves and for their own debts, 
want to claim 
receive the 
a remedy for 
for 
they can do that and I 
4 
THE CO! J R T : I I •, i It c i i di i t :. I t : allowed them -
that's exa c11y wha t I r m saying. The y a11owed a11 t hese 
. i O M ^iastercharge re pay oft deSts ci other parties. T: ey 
allowed t m s aeij_. * ~ • " * '.- • : 
understand the bank'" s argument and I understand the security 
aqreement but I've dealt with uiis an:: -..-*<: • - - . 
has the right to take it off the:- don ^, L^ ;tfset .r.e^r 
loans, to offset their payments i,uo ** ' aian u au LiiaL. 
_ _ : : .  c- t
 ; : u^: nave . T .\ -._' s no f what they did. 
"hey allowed ;i" ro be paid *c -^ber parties other than 
- - . .:- :: _y oeoioec m a t 
COUJ : do rh-S in tnis defacto rec-i ver.tnip ar-d that'1 w^ar 
I m r ' I rn i I 11 11 ' n'l n i I i ,il ! Li i rr ob 1 ^  ins Vg i I 1 ' 1J* I ,jw 
because there's nothing in the law thai I'm aware of that 
allows them to do that. 
MR JEN SON: T f the bank, however,, is controlling 
what ~ - na «d o^~ and why only so that the business can 
"... a t goes t o the b a n k.. 
THE COURT: What legal authority does it have to do 
thatn 
K" JENSOTT Well, :i I ' s allowed to do that under 
its securiuy a-T^em.---' 
THE COURT: No, there is no place in the security 
agreement that it- says it can havo a defactn recei1 'ership 
1 What it does is it says it can seize the account and it lists 
2 the items that it can seize and take control of those items 
3 and have them pay their debts but it can't substitute itself 
4 for the court or substitute itself for somebody else and say, 
5 NNYou know what, I'm going to pay your claim but I'm not going 
6 to allow your claim. I'm going to move your claim ahead of 
7 this claim because I think that's in my interest to move your 
8 claim ahead of my claim." I mean, they're taking on a role 
9 here that I think is really unique under the law and I don't 
10 think it's allowed, that's what I'm trying to ask. I mean, I 
11 understand the agreement and I understand the ability to 
12 offset and I understand the ability for them to say, "You now 
13 what, we don't think this is going to do that and we want to 
14 take all your receivables out to pay our debt because we 
15 don't you're going to be able to pay." I don't have any 
16 problem with that because that's what they agreed to and 
17 that's what the parties agreed to but that's not what they 
18 did, that's the part that I have the problem with because 
19 that's not what they did. 
20 MR. JENSON: Okay, I can see that. From my point 
21 of view if the bank is controlling the funds it's controlling 
22 how they're spent in furtherance of its own interests. If 
23 the bank is entitled to all of those funds and if they 
24 release funds so they can be paid more in the future, that to 
25 me seems to go right in the line of the bank's authority to 
tnat /ame ' nere was enouar. nonev to pay - profec: * he 
- j . L. In LdCt, iriey movec ,n. mer*: other people s: zh& 
checks cvz d go oui ana rav th-~^  • * 
the garnishment that came in tl: lat I believe under the law had 
t* ^ upenor security n"*" °rest . 
n:\n. ^a^ s^e that. The only 
difference I see here i:-' 1h^r i "he n^nk had those funds in 
< L a *-J :.e: . _ iney coulu m.: paid 
more - • • 
they received tine garriisnment. Tney either ha a \ '^.e them 
themselves or give them 1M r,,nmpbcviy thnt had i IN IIM I 
security interest. Tf they didn't want to protect their own 
right- - and the people that allowed this " 
:.. .ej ::.is was the bank and now what are they gcmg to 
;• . Are they going to go tn al I I hese individuals and qet 
it-'1', ^ "'I I i i H I I n i lii'i l mean I know Cache Valley -
:-ey' re not coma :o a.; :c ail these people that checks were 
written arid LO •.-•'. 3 
money back. 
vr. ip.NSC* \ 1 can s* 
,fisition . .... . . :.c mnus thai were received by the bank 
after the date of garnishment, unless the bank put I I I S H 
1 somebody else when there was a valid federal tax lien?" I 
2 mean, it appears that they could come back against the bank 
3 too. 
4 ' MR. JENSON: True. I see that as well. 
5 THE COURT: I mean, I'm not - banks have 
6 obligations. Garnishments and these kinds of things and 
7 liens are things that happen all the time. I mean, it's 
8 seems quite incredible to me that they don't understand the 
9 legal ramifications of this, and they create something that 
10 in the law, I mean, they even have to call it the defacto 
11 receivership which means it's really not a legal one, it's 
12 just one we've created of our own doing. 
13 MR. JENSON: Right. 
14 THE COURT: I mean, that word alone tells me-
15 MR. JENSON: Yeah, I mean, it wasn't the bank's -
16 the bank has a vested interest to see that the (inaudible), I 
17 think, (inaudible) to the bank has a vested interested too. 
18 The bank doesn't want to kill the business because they hope 
19 to be repaid by (inaudible), whatever, plus thousands dollars 
20 still owed. And so my understanding from the bank was that 
21 certain debts were allowed to be paid but only because that 
22 would allow business to continue to repay the bank. Like - I 
23 don't know the specific details for each -
24 THE COURT: But do you see the difficulty that that 
25 places with the Court because the bank then is substituting 
THF a")npi • ' • ' ; — \ {. bdfiL now three 
hearings to produce the evidence *a at- w what they did, that 
the inaudible). • liaciMay, special 
hearing that I have allowed Cache Bank. I mean, I'm not -
and the affidavit of the person ' -. ---^  -~~ -
receivership, and so we centre1, L * aaer- " u s "•;• • was 
spent and we allowed money *^ n° sent to these *r 
: ar: i£nni.o:r_ : :r a valid judgment, I 
mean, there's no question that thai 'a whether they did it 
..-"» •- -** .- aniens to go through, they 
ndo<=- :a aetermiaation that instead of taking -the mone> for 
themselves, ih^y a • er parties to 
pay their debts and move these other parties' debts in front 
a v ~V) 1 d iudqment with a qarn i a] m< M, f filed, Th^y decided, 
v. _ can do thai. And T don'1 think in the law they can do 
that. There i a no where in the law 1 L:. • • 
:: a u s >.-. 1. 11
 f 11 " • i I d n otise t. They're n ot o 11 s e r a J n q . 
". aey; re a.^c-wang somebody else to get the money instead m' 
thems'. " • . • - - ' . 
MR. JENSON: Weil, so, let's look at the facts, 
well, I^L :.ook at ;i t" /: v"i \ \J! a a1. 
I
i..:.. COURT: It's nor a hypothetical, ! his '.3 what 
really happened. 
h .:.„.a..a. Tf the bank received funds front 
deposits and aheia regained those, moved • Kn<^ • -
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1 would continue. 
2 T H E COURT: I'm not talking about hypotheticals. 
3 I'm talking about what they did. 
4 MR. JENSON: Well, if in action that's what they 
5 were doing, whether or not they took it out of that account. 
6 THE COURT: No, no. Come on, this is getting a 
7 little bit tiresome, honestly. I mean it is. 
8 MR. JENSON: If you feel that, Your Honor, if you 
9 feel that based on the evidence before you there is enough 
10 there to say definitively that what the bank did was allow 
11 the debtor to continue to pay these other creditors ahead of 
12 the judgment creditor here, I can see the problem with that. 
13 But if the bank was controlling those funds and only allowing 
14 in its own best interest certain other creditors to be paid 
15 so that the bank could continued to be paid, I don't see the 
16 problem with that. 
17 THE COURT: -well, okay, okay. But the evidence-
18 MR. JENSON: (Inaudible). 
19 THE COURT: I'm going to make the following findings 
20 based on the evidence. It appears that the date of the 
21 garnishment was November 1, 2006. Following that the bank 
22 failed to provide an offset as required by law, they didn't 
23 J set the offset as required by law. And so when we had the 
notice and the order to show cause they weren't in compliance 24 
25 with the garnishment statute as required within Rule 64, 
22 
because they didn't provide notice within the required time. 
MR. JENSON: Other than appearing at the hearing and 
showing the (inaudible) statement? 
THE COURT: Yes, yes. Yeah, but they didn't provide 
that notice timely as required under the garnishment statute. 
Even though they had notice of garnishment and everything 
else, they didn't provide the notice that is required under 
the garnishment statute that there was an offset. 
In addition, they did take an offset it appears of 
$17,000. However, into that account after the garnishment 
was a total of $41,789.52. They didn't take any other 
further offsets for themselves. The evidence that I have 
before me would indicate that they allowed the judgment 
debtor to continue to write checks and allow those checks to 
clear the bank to pay third parties while that garnishment 
was still in place, and was a valid garnishment still in 
place, and that the funds that they allowed to go out was in 
excess of the garnishment that was owed. I mean, they took 
their own money and there was still sufficient funds to pay 
the garnishment ahead of these others. They have denoted 
this as a defacto receivership. There is nothing in Rule 64 
or in the Uniform Commercial Code or in any of the agreements 
that I can see that would allow them to create this defacto 
receivership that would allow them to do what they have done 
in this case to circumvent a valid judgment and a valid 
23 
1 garnishment, and therefore, what they did violated and was in 
2 contempt of the order of the Court. And as a result, they 
3 should be ordered to pay the amount of the garnishment. 
4 MR. JENSON: If the bank were able to show that all 
5 of the funds that were dispersed from the account-
6 THE COURT: Okay. And I've been through it. This 
7 is the third opportunity that I've given the bank to present 
8 evidence on its behalf. And I have - and I think I've really 
9 been very open and very - and we've had three separate 
10 hearings scheduled to come in and say, "Bank, present what 
11 evidence to show me that you have - that what you did 
12 J complied with the law and its valid." And I've received the 
13 evidence and that the evidence that I've received would be 
14 consistent with the findings that I have made. And so, at 
15 this point, you know, I've entered the order and I guess if 
16 they want to appeal the order I've entered they can. 
17 I I'm going to ask to prepare findings and an order 
18 consistent with my findings. And if they believe the 
19 evidence shows or establishes something different then - but 
20 under the law, I don't see any other result. I'm not trying 
21 to be arbitrary, I'm not trying to be anything. 
22 MR. JENSON: No. 
23 THE COURT: I'm just - because they're doing 
24 something that I don't see anywhere in the law, and I've 
25 J tried to research it, honestly, you know, is there such a 
24 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss: 
County of Cache ) 
Gregg Miller, being first duly sworn and upon oath, states as follows: 
1. I am the President of Cache Valley Bank (hereinafter "Bank"), the Garnishee in these 
proceedings. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts attested in this Affidavit and contained in the 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF GARNISHEE'S RESPONSE TO 
GARNISHMENT and ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE IN RE CONTEMPT, filed herewith. 
3. Sometime after the service upon Cache Valley Bank of the First Garnishment (April 
24, 2006), the Bank management exercised its business judgment to allow remittance of the 
garnishment amount, and soon thereafter, the Bank began to monitor and control all funds 
owned by the Third-Party Defendant's on deposit at the Bank. 
4. In light of the perceived insolvency of the Third-Party Defendants, and their probable 
inability to repay outstanding loan obligations, Bank management began operation of, more 
or less, a receivership to allow deposits to be made into the bank accounts, with Bank 
management control over all disbursements made from the accounts. 
5. Throughout the de-facto receivership, the Bank has only allowed certain 
disbursements to be made that would allow Third-Party Defendant to continue business 
operations in a way that would allow for the repayment of loans to the Bank. 
2 
6. In establishing the de-facto receivership, the Bank management exercised its business 
judgment to protect the Bank's secured interests in the funds held in the bank accounts, as 
well as the Bank's secured interests in the business and property of Third-Party Defendants 
(including accounts receivable, inventory, equipment, etc., in which the Bank also holds 
secured interests). 
7. When the Second Garnishment was served on the Bank (on or about October 19, 
2006), all funds held by the Bank in the Third-Party Defendants' bank accounts were 
removed, and the accounts were left with zero balance remaining. (See attached Exhibit 
"A", containing bank account statements) 
8. Subsequent to service of the Second Garnishment, the Bank management has 
continued to monitor and control the bank accounts, as well as monitor the business activities 
and accounts receivable of the Third-Party Defendants, all in an attempt to recover more 
amounts owed to the bank from outstanding loan obligations. 
9. Currently, the business of Third-Party Defendants is in a basic state of liquidation. 
10. The Bank claims a perfected security interest in all assets of Third-Party Defendants, 
to the exclusion of all other creditors—including Third-Party Plaintiffs named herein. 
Affiant, being first duly sworn and under oath, states that he has read this document and 
understands it; the facts set forth are true. Further, Affiant saith naught. 
3 
DATED this 12th day of March, 2007 
w : 
;egg Mille 
*-i0£ ^ 
Merit, Cache Valley Bank 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO in the County of Cache, State of Utah, on this / ^ d a y 
of March, 2007, Gregg Miller, President of Cache Valley Bank, appeared before me, the 
undersigned Notary Public, and acknowledged to me that he signed this Affidavit voluntarily 
for its stated purpose, and the facts stated therein are true. 
*m*mm *• 
^ SHARON M. NIELSON 
Notary Public 
State of Utah 
My Commission Expires May 1,2009 I 
199 N. Main, Logan UT 84321 r 
rUlJUh^W 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
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